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And now for something completely different: Statutory
interpretation
I started my LLM thesis when I
was still in private practice. My
thesis was designed to tackle a
very practical black-letter law
problem I had encountered in my
practice as a property lawyer. In
analysing the issues however, I
branched out way beyond my
comfort zone into some
theoretical areas - law and
economics, feminist legal theory
and critical legal studies. Before
developing my thesis proposal I
had not even known that such
things existed. This was a
product of my largely doctrinal
undergraduate experience and
my immersion in commercial law
practice.
During this time however I read Nick James' 'Brief History of Critique in Legal Education' -
before I knew that legal education was even a thing. Now that I know a little more about
legal education, Nick's paper continues to inform my thinking. It is a useful reminder to me
that despite the monolithic appearance of the law and the appearance of solidity of the
term 'the profession', that they are subject to change. As Nick's paper makes clear also,
Australian legal education has been characterised by shifts between the practical and the
academic, culminating in the ascendancy of the professional legal academic.
The degree remains subject to judicial oversight through the Law Admissions Consultative
Committee ('LACC'). Its structure, moreover, must conform with the so-called Priestley 11,
the 11 core subjects considered to represent the cohesive body of discipline knowledge
requisite for legal practice.
Since the Priestleys were mandated in 1992 there have been a number of seismic shifts
that have generated debate about their utility and relevance. There are greater numbers
of law students not going on to practice; increasing globalisation of legal practice;
increasing specialisation of practitioners; and growing emphasis on legal skills and soft
skills rather than doctrinal content alone. LACC is presently considering whether to do a
small adjustment to the Priestleys, but the question I'm interested in pursuing here is
possibility of a Priestley 12 - the inclusion of statutory interpretation.
The statutory interpretation issue has arisen out of judicial concern as to practitioners'
capability in the field. Apparently, senior judges are concerned to see it as a skill given
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prominence in the law degree beyond a foundations approach in first year. LACC itself has
published a statement on statutory interpretation.
The issue has been kept alive now for many years. There has been ongoing discussion
between LACC and the Council of Australian Law Deans ('CALD'). Legal academics have
been hearing for some time of the possibility of a mandated 12th Priestley subject. While
all law schools cover statutory interpretation in a foundation subject, some law schools
have pre-empted any mandated subject by introducing a capstone compulsory statutory
interpretation subject. Generally though, law schools seem to resist the imposition of a
further mandated subject.
For me the biggest challenge has been to understand what has been meant by 'statutory
interpretation'. In foundation subjects it is dealt with through an understanding of the
legislative process; and the rules of textual interpretation. For the rest of the degree, I
think it is probably fair to say that interpretation has traditionally been implicit in legal
education - without an explicit statement to students that 'what you are doing now is
actually statutory interpretation'.
In recent years I have become more explicit in my teaching of statute law. I no longer
merely address sections of an Act - which was certainly the way that I was taught and
which is largely reflected even in contemporary texts - but take students through the Act
in its entirety. We look at its purpose, its enactment, its framework and key definitional
and application provisions before we go into any detail.
To give meaning to 'statutory interpretation' in the context of this area of the law, I call
this 'working with statutes'. It is not a highly theoretical approach. It is entirely derived
from my own experience as a transactional lawyer, navigating statutes on a daily basis and
attempting to make meaning. A practitioner needs to answer questions: What is the source
of this power? What is the process required for lawful activity? What is the source of this
right? What is the meaning of this word? And so on.
At a meeting on 27 March of the Legal Education Associate Deans ('LEAD') hosted at UNSW,
we discussed an iterative draft of new guidelines for statutory interpretation. In response
to ongoing judicial concern about the state of statutory interpretation teaching in
Australian law schools, CALD is presently building on the LACC statement on statutory
interpretation. My understanding is that it is hoped that this will demonstrate law schools'
effective engagement in statutory interpretation.
My own view of the draft is that it is an impressive and valuable work. It has clarified for
me, what the judges really mean by 'statutory interpretation'. The draft highlights that this
is a discrete legal discipline. It is significantly more than 'simply' an essential skill. But it
also highlights to me that there are a number of implications.
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First, legal academics with expertise in particular discipline areas may need to expand
their expertise in the discipline of statutory interpretation - even where they may have the
skill, it seems that this may not be sufficient.
Secondly, as a transactional lawyer I remain unclear about the relationship between the
judicial understanding of statutory interpretation as a discrete discipline - a component of
public law - and private law. In particular, private law as transaction. As Howarth points
out, the vast majority of law is transactional. Judges' experiences are obviously important
but they exist in a realm that is quite different from the way in which law, including
statute law, is experienced and practised. This is not to diminish the role of public law, or
the role of statutory interpretation as a discipline. But as a private lawyer I need to find a
way to understand what I do 'working with statutes' as public. I recognise that the
distinction between public and private law is porous, but my first impression is that this
introduces a different way of challenging the public/private law taxonomy.
Thirdly, and following from this idea, is that if a new framework of statutory interpretation
is adopted, the curriculum must inevitably look different. The subject areas will remain
the same, but learning outcomes, the way doctrine is taught, and assessment will all need
to respond to the discipline area of statutory interpretation. No longer a skill, doctrinal
areas will need to be reshaped to accommodate a more explicitly deeply theoretical and
(public) law based approach to statute. My 'working with statutes' approach must be more
securely grounded in the discipline of statutory interpretation.
Fourthly, and somewhat paradoxically, there is an existing critique of the domination of
appellate case law in legal education. The case law method largely excludes students from
experiencing the reality of law, particularly transactional law and alternative dispute
resolution. It suggests that law exists via litigation; the role of the lawyer is as litigator;
and the higher appellate courts are where the law is at. The latter point is, of course, at
least partly correct in terms of the court's role as the third arm of government. But I would
disagree that this is the law. The oversight of legal education by the judges, drawn almost
entirely from the ranks of the bar, may suggest why the case law emphasis exists in legal
education.
Thus it is the doctrine of precedent that is taught first in law school. Followed by the
largely abstract, to students, foundational statutory interpretation. When we teach other
subjects, the common law evolution of legal concepts - such as land title, mortgages and
leases - tends then be followed by the statutory regulation. There is a tendency towards a
'lexical priority' of the common law over statute, that infuses the fabric of legal education.
The hidden message of this, despite the reality of the huge increase in statutory regulation
of our lives, is that Courts Rule OK. The statute - paramount, ever present - is secondary.
Furthermore, it is subject to court scrutiny under a public law framework.
And finally, returning to Nick James' history, I perceive there to be a swing afoot. Law
schools, always cognisant of the professional regulatory environment and keen to respect
the institutions of the law, at the same time want to be free to design their courses. Law
schools operate with a foot in the camp of the profession (represented largely through
LACC and the considerable influence of the judiciary) and of the higher education
environment.
Universities are demanding greater emphasis on skills, including soft skills; on moving away
from content; on grasping new technologies and innovating in teaching; on marketing a
distinctive degree; on attracting international students - and so it goes. Less money for
permanent academic lawyers means more sessional lecturers - often from the ranks of the
profession.
The profession apparently seeks work-ready graduates, skilled up and ready to earn on day
one. The existing professional regulatory framework however focusses on content, on
doctrine, although the Priestley 11 has been complemented by the Discipline Standards for
Law which call for the embedding of a range of skills within the existing Priestley doctrinal
framework. Does the present discussion surrounding statutory interpretation, even without
a resultant 12th mandatory subject, represent an implicit rearrangement of legal education
from outside the ranks of the academy? Is the suggestion of statutory interpretation's
discrete discipline focus, a shift away from the practical towards the academic?
Swing?
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*The title 'A Brief History of Critique in Legal Education' for some reason always brings to mind Terry Gilliam's absurdist
cartoons. [This is no reflection on the author. Or the subject matter.]
